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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--"FREE TELEVISION ACT" PASSED
BY CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTORATE HELD VIOLATIVE OF
FREE SPEECH GUARANTEE. Weaver v. Jordan (Cal. 1966).
In the 1964 California general election, the people passed Prop-
osition 15. Known as the "Free Television Act," its stated aim
was the prohibition of subscription television within the state.:
Shortly after the passage of the Act, the petitioner sought to file
his articles 6f incorporation with the respondent Secretary of State.
The respondent refused to file the articles on the ground that
petitioner's proposed subscription television business was proscribed
by the Act. Petitioner then brought action for declaratory relief,
alleging that the Act was unconstitutional under both the United
States and California constitutions. The trial court granted summary
judgment for the petitioner, and on direct appeal to the California
Supreme Court, held, affirmed: Proposition 15 is an unconstitutional
abridgement of the guarantee of free speech provided in both the
United States and California constitutions.2 A strong dissenting
opinion by Justice Mosk challenged the three basic premises of the
majority opinion. Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Adv. Cal. 243, 411 P.2d 289,
49 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 844 (1966).
The basic premises upon which the majority chose to affirm the
summary judgment decision were: (1) The first amendment free-
doms of press, speech, and religion, which are protected from
invasion by state action by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, have a paramount and preferred place in our democratic
system; (2) due to this preferred position, legislation which touches
upon these freedoms comes before the court bearing a heavy pre-
sumption against its constitutional validity; and (3) the unlimited
potential scope of the Act demands that its constitutionality be
determined by an application of the clear and present danger test.
The relative position of the first amendment guarantees among
the rights of society has become the subject of considerable academic
conflict.3 Mr. Justice Douglas explained the preferred position
1 Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Adv. Cal. 243, 247 n.1, 411 P.2d 289, 291 n.1, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 537, 539 n.1 (1966) ("The public shall have the right to view any television
program on a home television set free of charge regardless of how such program is
transmitted....") (Hereinafter referred to as Act).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I, XIV; Calif. CoNsT. art. I, § 9.
3 See Mason, The Core of Free Government, 1938-40: Ir. Justice Stone and "Pre-
ferred Freedoms," 65 YALEa L.J. 597 (1956); McKay, The Preference for Freedom,
34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1182 (1959).
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concept thusly: "[The first amendment guarantees] are preferred
because the Constitution, as construed, protects them against abridg-
ment by either the States or the federal government. Few other
provisions of the Bill of Rights have ever been applied in full force
to the States."4 Mr. Justice Frankfurter espoused: "This [the pre-
ferred position concept] is a phrase that has uncritically crept into
some recent opinions of this Court. I deem it a mischievous phrase,
if it carries the thought, which it may subtly imply, that any law
touching communication is infected with presumptive invalidity."5
It has been suggested that the concept preferred position, when
discussed in conjunction with the freedoms guaranteed by the first
amendment, has threatened to become a substitute for analysis.6
Despite the conflict over the meaning and significance of this concept,
it has been skillfully described as a concept the objectives of which
may be implemented by
a variety of devices, to be employed separately or in combination,
which enable the courts to express the constitutionally mandated
preference for freedom of speech and thought. Among these are
the dear and present danger test; narrowing of the presumption of
constitutionality; strict construction of statutes to avoid limitation
of first amendment freedoms; the prohibitions against prior re-
straint and subsequent punishment; relaxation of the requirement
of standing to sue where first amendment issues are involved; and
generally higher standards of procedural due process where these
freedoms are in jeopardy. Not one, but the sum total of these-
and more-make up the preferred position concept.7
Justice Mosk's dissent to Weaver v. Jordan suggests that the
majority opinion may have used the "epithet" preferred position
in lieu of a more complete analysis of the problem, the result being
that summary judgment could be administered in light of the
presumption of unconstitutionality which rested upon the threshold
of the decision." Absent the presumption that the Act was uncon-
stitutional, it would appear that the Weaver v. Jordan court would
have encountered considerable difficulty in arriving at the conclusion
that no justiciable issue of fact existed, a conclusion necessary for
the administering of summary judgment.9
The majority's third premise was that, due to the potentially
4 DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAc OF LiBERTY 03 (1954). '
5 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90 (1949) (concurring opinion).
6 FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNrrD STATES 75 (1961).
7 McKay, supra note 3, at 1184. The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rlv.
1182, 1184 (1959).
8 64 Adv. Cal. at 258, 411 P.2d at 299, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
9 See CAL. CODE Civ. PRo. § 437(c).
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unlimited scope of the Act, a determination of the Act's constitu-
tionality required an application of the clear and present danger
test. This test was first enunciated in 1919 in Schenck v. United
States,10 which involved a prosecution for sedition. Mr. Justice
Holmes stated that the Court should determine whether the words
used by the defendant "are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent."" The Espionage Act under which the defendant Schenck
had been convicted was by its very nature aimed at restricting the
content of an individual's speech. Since Sehenck, the United States
Supreme Court has implemented this test when called upon to
determine the constitutionality of a statute which sought to restrict
the content of free speech.12 However, when the Court has been
called upon to determine the constitutionality of a statute designed to
regulate conduct, as opposed to speech, and thereby preserve some
state or public interest, it has implemented the ad hoc balancing
test.13 It is submitted that a proper recognition of the stated purposes
of Proposition 15 would have necessitated an application of the
ad hoc balancing test to reach the merit, if any, in plaintiff's con-
tention that the Act abridged his first amendment rights. 14 Prop-
osition 15 was directed at the preservation of the free television
industry in California. It's purpose was not aimed at restricting the
content or the right of free speech, but was intended to be a general
regulatory measure designed to insure the preservation of the state's
1o 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
11 Ibid.
12 E.g., American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Debs
v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204
(1919).
Is Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Breard v. Alexandria,
341 U.S. 622 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U.S. 141 (1943); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr.
69.
14 "Throughout its history, this Court has consistently recognized at least two ways
in which constitutionally protected freedom of speech is narrower than an unlimited
license to talk. On the one hand, certain forms of speech, or speech in certain con-
texts, has been considered outside the scope of constitutional protection. . . .On the
other hand, general regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of speech
but incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the type
of law the First or Fourteenth Amendment forbade Congress or the States to pass,
when they have been found justified by subordinating valid governmental interests, a
prerequisite to constitutionality which has necessarily involved a weighing of the
governmental interest involved." Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., supra note 13,
at 49-50; see also 30 CAL. JuR. 2d, Libel and Slander, § 4, and Lewdness, Indecency,
and Obscenity, § 4.
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interest in giving the people the broadest possible sources of informa-
tion and entertainment-free television reception.1"
Consider for a moment the distinctions between the two tests.
Generally, the courts seem to have interpreted the clear and present
danger test as inquiring: (1) Is the primary objective of the legis-
lation a restriction on the content of speech? (2) Is such legislation
necessary to prevent either violence or some other substantive evil
which the legislature is empowered to prevent? (3) Is there a clear
and present danger that this evil will arise absent the particular
legislation? (4) Does the gravity of the threatened evil, when
balanced against the improbability of its occurrence, justify the
particular legislation? Assuming that an affirmative finding has
been made on each of the four inquiries, the statute or ordinance
has been declared constitutional. 6
To be distinguished from the above test is the ad hoc balancing
test, which inquires: (1) Is this a generally regulatory statute, not
intended to control the content of speech, but incidentally limiting
its unfettered exercise? (2) Do the purposes to be served by the
legislation in question outweigh the particular hardships which will
be suffered by those who come within the purview of the statute?
(3) Is the statute or ordinance reasonable in light of the objectives
to be furthered?17 In applying either test, the necessity of making
the correct initial inquiry is vital. Without deciding whether the
statute is designed to control content or merely conduct, the value
and significance of each test is lost, and the constitutionality of the
particular statute is thereby determined by legal reasoning foreign
to either test.
In Weaver v. Jordan the initial inquiry was not directed to the
purpose of the particular act, but instead was directed to the scope
and breadth of its enforcement.' 8 In the words of Justice Burke:
"When a restriction of a First Amendment freedom is of such
unlimited potential scope it may be imposed only to avoid a 'dear
and present danger' that a substantive evil will otherwise result
which the state has a right to prevent."' 19 The importance of Justice
Burke's original inquiry into the scope of the Act is reflected in
15 64 Adv. Cal. at 247 n.1, 411 P.2d at 291 n.1, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 539 n.1.
16 Cases cited note 12 supra.
17 Cases cited note 13 supra.
18 64 Adv. Cal. at 252, 411 P.2d at 295, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
'9 Ibid.
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his subsequent treatment of the constitutional question. His treatment
is best depicted by a statement which contains the legal premise
upon which the constitutional issue was framed, to wit: When a
statute touches upon the first amendment guarantees of free
speech and expression, and the statute is wide sweeping in scope,
the constitutionality of the statute must be determined by an
application of the clear and present danger test. His reasoning may
also be said to subtly imply the proposition that if the scope of the
statute is narrow in effect, the ad hoc balancing test must be used
to determine the question of the statute's constitutionality.
The Weaver v. Jordan court concluded, without enunciating a
standard, that the effect of the Act was of unlimited potential
scope. The court therefore was required to determine the presence
or absence of a clear and present danger that a substantive evil
would result in the absence of this legislation. In this respect, the
court concluded that the allegation of a clear and present danger
of a monopoly arising from the existence of home subscription
television was mere speculation.20 Furthermore, the court declared
that even if such allegation were taken as unquestionable fact, the
fact would demonstrate no clear and present danger of any sub-
stantive evil to be avoided by the wide sweeping suppression proposed
by the Act.21 As a result, the California Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court's granting of summary judgment to the petitioner.
A major criticism leveled by the dissent was the finding of a
constitutional issue in the case. In the words of the dissent:
If this were a freedom of speech case, the majority opinion would
be unassailable, and I would join in it.
As I see it, however, my associates are vanquishing an illusory
adversary. The target here is not speech; it is merely a matter of
dollars and the power of the people of the state to decide who gets
them.
2 2
In support of the contention that a first amendment decision is
inapplicable to the case at bar, the dissent cities three cases.
In Lorain Journal Co. v. United States,28 a newspaper publisher
attempted to monopolize interstate commerce by refusing ads from
individuals who also advertised on a local radio station. He was
20 Id. at 253, 411 P.2d at 296, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
21 Ibid.
22 Id. at 258, 411 P.2d at 299, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
23 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
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convicted of violating section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The
Court held that the injunction against the newspaper publisher's.
continued attempt to monopolize interstate commerce did not
violate the first amendment's guaranty of freedom of the press. The
Court labeled this case as an antitrust problem, although it recog-
nized that the right of a newspaper to select its own advertising is
a qualified one. In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,24 the
Court labeled the case as one raising a question of FCC regulation.
The Court held that the FCC, by announcing that it would refuse
station licenses to persons who engage in specified network practices
contrary to the public interest, does not thereby deny to such person
the constitutional right of free speech. The Court reasoned that,
if such were true, every person whose application for a license to
operate a station was turned down would be denied his constitutional
right of free speech. The last case cited by Justice Mosk was
Associated Press v. United States,25 where the Court convicted the
defendant of violating the Sherman Antitrust Act. The Court held
that, although freedom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution,
freedom to combine to keep others from publishing is not protected.
In addition to the three cited cases, there is other authority
supporting the contention of the dissent in Weaver v. Jordan that
there was no constitutional question involved.26 Several picketing
cases have appeared in the past three decades which are illustrative
of judicial attempts to raise non-existent constitutional issues 7 It
has been suggested that, as a failure of the courts in some cases to
make a distinction between speech and conduct, the courts in the
picketing cases have fallen into error2
The confusion began in Thornhill v. Alabama,29 where the
Court identified peaceful picketing with freedom of speech. Sub-
sequently, in American Federation of Labor v. Swing,30 the Court
held an injunction against picketing to be an unconstitutional in-
fringement upon freedom of communication. The Supreme Court
then began to retreat from the Thornhill and Swing opinions,31
24 319 U.s. 190 (1943).
25 326 U.S. 1 (1945).




29 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
30 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
31 Plumbers Union Local No. 10 v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953); Teamsters
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resulting in the establishment of authority both for and against
deciding picketing cases on a constitutional basis. So great was the
confusion that Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dissent to IBT v. Vogt,
Inc.,32 stated:
Today the Court signs the formal surrender. State courts and state
legislatures cannot fashion blanket prohibitions on all picketing.
But . . .state courts and state legislatures are free to decide
whether to permit or suppress any particular picket line for any
reason other than a blanket policy against all picketing.33
It has been said that this is as the law ought to be. "Much of the
intermediate confusion could have been avoided had the First
Amendment through the Fourteenth not been made the basis for
the decisions in the Thornhill and Swing cases."3 4
The difficulty in the picketing cases seems to have arisen from the
fact that picketing not only involves freedom of speech, but also
falls within the purview of certain statutes designed to regulate
conduct. As a consequence of picketing being a product of both
speech and conduct, one witnesses judicial decisions upholding the
right to picket, based upon the guarantee of free speech, and on the
other hand, the enjoining of picketing as creating a clear and present
danger of inciting people to riot, or as a violation of the right to
work or antitrust laws.3" Weaver v. Jordan, although not a picketing
case, supports the proposition that free speech cases, as compared
to cases involving only conduct, are not always easily separated. 0
Hence, Justice Mosk was not devoid of authority when he suggested
that Weaver v. Jordan did not pose a constitutional question.
In light of the decision in Weaver v. Jordan, several varied con-
Union Local No. 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950); Giboney v. Empire Storage &
Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Carpenters Union Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315
U.S. 722 (1942).
32 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
33 Id. at 297.
34 Rogge, supra note 26, at 367.
S5 Plumbers Union Local No. 10 v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953); Teamsters
Union Local No. 309 v. Hanke 339 U.S. 470 (1950); Giboney v. Empire Storage &
Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Carpenters Union Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315
U.S. 722 (1942); AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88 (1940).
36 For discussion pro and con on the point, see FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE
SuPREmE CouRT 18 (1949) ("Picketing is indeed a hybrid, comprising elements of
non-verbal conduct, economic pressure and signals for action.") ; Teller, Picketing and
Free Speech, 56 HAv. L. REv. 180 (1942); Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech: A Dis.
sent, 56 HARv. L. REv. 513 (1943); Teller, Picketing and Free Speech: A Reply, 56
HARv. L. REv. 532 (1943); Jaffe, In Defense of the Supreme Court's Picketing Doc.
trine, 41 MIcH. L. REv. 1037 (1943).
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sequences may ensue if the rule finds application in subsequent
litigation.37 The most severe consequence which could result would
be an erosion of the first amendment guarantee of freedom of
speech.
A vital-but perhaps not obvious-purpose is served by limiting
legislation designed to restrict the content of speech to cases where
a clear and present danger would arise absent the legislation. The
extremely vital purpose is the preservation of the first amendment
guarantees. Judicial interpretation, rather than mere coincidence,
necessitated the long line of decisions holding legislative bodies
without authority to enact legislation which would restrict the
content of free speech, the only exceptions having been in the cases
of legislation designed to prevent a clear and present danger of
some evil or harm from arising."'
Weaver v. Jordan has possibly opened a new avenue to legislators
who seek statutory restrictions upon the content of free speech. By
way of illustration, assume the hypothetical legislation has been
enacted designed to restrict, in some aspect, the content of free
speech. Prior to Weaver v. Jordan, the only justification for such
legislation would have been in a finding that a clear and present
danger of some evil existed. Application of the Weaver v. Jordan
rationale requires an initial inquiry into the scope of the legislation,
with the conclusion that, if the legislation is wide sweeping, then
the clear and present danger test is applicable. Assume in the
illustration that the particular legislation, although designed to
restrict the content of free speech, was narrow in scope. The rationale
of Weaver v. Jordan would then suggest that the constitutionality
of the statute be tested by an application of the ad hoc balancing
test. If the court concluded that the public interest to be benefited
outweighed the individual hardship which a few citizens might
encounter, the legislation would be found constitutional. Consequent-
ly, legislation aimed at controlling the content of speech could
be upheld under either the -lear and present danger test or the
ad hoc balancing test, not merely the former test.
Perhaps the failure of the courts in times past to observe the
37 On February 15, 1966, the Federal Communications Commission purported to ex-
tend its jurisdiction to include regulation of virtually all forms of community antenna
television. This would imply a future question of federal preemption. 64 Adv. Cal. at
258 n.1, 411 P.2d at 299.n.1, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 547 n.1.
38 Cases cited note 12 supra.
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separate character of the two tests has led to the reasoning in
Weaver v. Jordan. Although the vast number of earlier cases have
employed the two constitutional tests in the traditional fashion,
there have been substantial deviations from such uses, as witnessed
by the picketing cases.89 In order to better understand why the
court was led to depart from the traditional use of these two
constitutional tests, a brief analysis of the cases cited in support of
this position is helpful.
In each of the cases cited as supporting authority for the use of
the ad hoc balan-ing test, the courts were confronted with ordinances
or statutes which were narrow in scope of operation.40 In Breard v.
Alexandria,41 the United States Supreme Court held constitutional
a city ordinance prohibiting door to door solicitation where the
solicitor had failed to obtain the landowner's or occupant's permission
to enter the premises. Here the ordinance was aimed at regulating
conduct of the salesmen in the best interests of the community.
Because the ordinance was direct at regulating conduct, and only
incidentally prohibited the exercise of free speech, the Court stated:
"This makes the constitutionality of Alexandria's ordinance turn
upon a balancing of the conveniences between some householders'
desire for privacy and the publisher's right to distribute publications
in the precise way that those soliciting for him think brings the
best results."4' Breard ostensibly connotes two lines of reasoning
which should have led to the use of the ad ho- balancing test: (1)
The court employed the test because the statute was narrow in scope;
or (2) the court employed the test because the ordinance sought to
regulate conduct. A fair reading of the case reveals that the second
line of reasoning led to the application of the ad hoc balancing
test, yet the possibility of finding the first line of reasoning dominant
can not be discounted.
In Martin v. City of Struthers,43 the United States Supreme Court
held unconstitutional a municipal ordinance forbidding any person
39 See Antieau, "Clear and Present Danger"-Its Meaning and Significance, 25
NoTE DAME LAw. 601 (1950) ; Boudin, "Seditious Doctrines' And The "Clear And
Present Danger" Rule, 38 VA. L. REv. 143 (1952); Meikeljohn, What Does the First
Amendment Mean?, 20 U. Ci. L. REV. 461 (1953); Mendelson, Clear and Present
Danger-From Schenck to Dennis, 52 COLum. L. REv. 313 (1952) ; Rogge, supra note
26; Comment, Statutory Prohibition of Group Defamation, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 595
(1947).
40 Cases cited note 13 supra.
41 341 U.S. 622.
42 Id. at 644.
43 319 U.S. 141.
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to knock on doors, ring door bells or otherwise summon to the door
occupants for the purpose of distributing handbills or circulars.
Once again the ordinance was directed toward regulating conduct
of salesmen or others seeking to distribute handbills. In this case
the ordinance sought a total prohibition against such solicitation,
whereas in Breard the opportunity to solicit was merely conditioned
upon first gaining the consent of the owner or occupier of the
premises. As a consequence, Struther's ordinance should be regarded
as "wide sweeping," as it purported to be an absolute prohibition
against the prescribed conduct, a prohibition also true of Proposition
15 in Weaver v. Jordan. The Struthers court, recognizing the ordi-
nance as designed to regulate conduct rather than speech, applied
the ad hoc balancing test in order to determine the constitutionality
of the ordinance.44
In each of the other two cases cited by the majority, the statute
or ordinance was generally narrow in scope, regulatory in nature,
and directed at controlling conduct, but only incidentally restricting
the exercise of free speech.45 In neither of the statutes concerned
was there evidence of the legislature having sought to restrict the
content of free speech. Both the foregoing cases and the picketing
cases have had their effect on the traditional application of the
clear and present danger and the ad hoc balancing tests. The repeated
application of the two tests in both doubtful areas and in virgin
areas such as picketing has caused much of the existing confusion.40
In affirming the summary judgment given below, the California
Supreme Court necessarily affirmed the trial court's holding that
Proposition 15 was unconstitutional. However, the court was not
precluded from remanding the case for trial on the merits had it
not accepted the lower court's contention that the preferred position
concept tainted the Act -with a presumption of unconstitutionality.
Whether the first amendment guarantees will be "softened" by
the Weaver v. Jordan reasoning depends upon finding subsequent
application of the reasoning in determining the constitutionality
of a narrowly constructed statute designed to control the content of
44 "We are faced in the instant case with the necessity of weighing the conflicting
interests of the appellant in the civil rights she claims, as well as the right of the in-
dividual householder to determine whether he is willing to receive her message, against
the interest of the community which by this ordinance offers to protect the interests of
all its citizens, whether particular citizens want that protection or not." Id. at 143.
45 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
46 Rogge, supra note 26.
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speech. If the question arises, the courts might well find themselves
confronted with the difficult task of formulating a positive standard
for a dear-cut determination as to whether a particular statute is
narrow or wide sweeping in scope-a standard not to be found in
Weaver v. Jordan.
THOMAS WILLIAM HUMPHERYS
